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Abstract: Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) have been used for building Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS). The increase in both the number and sheer variety of new cyber-attacks
poses a tremendous challenge for IDS solutions that rely on a database of historical attack signatures.
Therefore, the industrial pull for robust IDSs that are capable of flagging zero-day attacks is growing.
Current outlier-based zero-day detection research suffers from high false-negative rates, thus limiting
their practical use and performance. This paper proposes an autoencoder implementation for
detecting zero-day attacks. The aim is to build an IDS model with high recall while keeping
the miss rate (false-negatives) to an acceptable minimum. Two well-known IDS datasets are
used for evaluation—CICIDS2017 and NSL-KDD. In order to demonstrate the efficacy of our
model, we compare its results against a One-Class Support Vector Machine (SVM). The manuscript
highlights the performance of a One-Class SVM when zero-day attacks are distinctive from normal
behaviour. The proposed model benefits greatly from autoencoders encoding-decoding capabilities.
The results show that autoencoders are well-suited at detecting complex zero-day attacks. The results
demonstrate a zero-day detection accuracy of 89–99% for the NSL-KDD dataset and 75–98% for the
CICIDS2017 dataset. Finally, the paper outlines the observed trade-off between recall and fallout.
Keywords: autoencoder; artificial neural network; one-class support vector machine; intrusion detection;
zero-day attacks; CICIDS2017; NSL-KDD
1. Introduction
Central to tackling the exponential rise in cyber-attacks [1,2], is Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
systems that are capable of detecting zero-day cyber-attacks. Machine Learning (ML) techniques
have been extensively utilised for designing and building robust IDS [3,4]. However, while current
IDS can achieve high detection accuracy for known attacks, they often fail to detect new, zero-day
attacks. This is due to the limitations of current IDS, which rely on pre-defined patterns and signatures.
Moreover, current IDS suffer from high false-positive rates, thus limiting the performance and their
practical use in real-life deployments. As a result, large numbers of zero-day attacks remain undetected,
which escalate their consequences (denial of service, stolen customer details, etc.).
According to Chapman [5], a zero-day attack is defined as “a traffic pattern of interest that,
in general, has no matching patterns in malware or attack detection elements in the network” [5].
The implications of zero-day attacks in real-world are discussed by Bilge and Dumitras [6].
Their research focuses on studying their impact and prevalence. The authors highlight that zero-day
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attacks are significantly more prevalent than suspected, demonstrating that, out of their 18 analysed
attacks, 11 (61%) were previously unknown [6]. Their findings showed that a zero-day attack can exist
for a substantial period of time (average of 10 months [6]) before they are detected and can compromise
systems during that period. Additionally, Nguyen and Reddi [7] refer to a statistical study that shows
that 62% of the attacks are identified after compromising systems. Moreover, the number of zero-day
attacks in 2019 exceeds the previous three years [8]. All of these considerations highlight the clear and
urgent need for more effective attack detection models.
One of the main research directions to detect zero-day attacks relies on detecting outliers
(i.e., instances/occurrences that vary from benign traffic). However, the main drawback of the
available outlier-based detection techniques is their relatively low accuracy rates as a result of both high
false-positive rates and high false-negative rates. As discussed, the high false-negative rates leave the
system vulnerable to attack, while the high false-positive rates needlessly consume the time of cyber
security operation centres; indeed, only 28% of investigated intrusions are real [9]. Ficke et al. [10]
emphasise the limitations that false-negative could bring to IDS development, for example, it reduces
IDS effectiveness.
Sharma et al. [11] proposed a framework to detect zero-day attacks in Internet of Things (IoT)
networks. They rely on a distributed diagnosis system for detection. Sun et al. [12] proposed a Bayesian
probabilistic model to detect zero-day attack paths. The authors visualised attacks in a graph-like
structure and introduced a prototype to identify attacks. Zhou and Pezaros [13] evaluated six different
supervised ML techniques; using the CIC-AWS-2018 dataset. The authors use decision tree, random
forest, k-nearest neighbour, multilayer perceptron, quadratic discriminant analysis, and gaussian naïve
bayes classifiers. The authors do not fully detail how these supervised ML techniques are trained on
benign traffic solely to be utilised for unknown attacks detection or how zero-day (previously unseen)
attacks are simulated and detected. Moreover, transfer learning is used to detect zero-day attacks.
Zhao et al. [14] used transfer learning to map the connection between known and zero-day attacks [14].
Sameera and Shashi [15] used deep transudative transfer learning to detect zero-day attacks.
Furthermore, ML is used to address Zero-day malware detection. For example, Abri et al. evaluated
the effectiveness of using different ML techniques (Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naïve Bayes,
Multi-Layer Perceptron, Decision trees, k-Nearest Neighbour, and Random Forests) to detect zero-day
malware [16], while Kim et al. [17] proposed the use of Deep-Convolutional Generative Adversarial
Network (DCGAN).
In this paper, we propose utilising the capabilities of Deep Learning (DL) to serve as outlier
detection for zero-day attacks with high recall. The main goal is to build a lightweight intrusion
detection model that can detect new (unknown) intrusions and zero-day attacks, with a high recall
(true-positive rate) and low fallout (false-positive rate). Accordingly, having a high detection capability
of zero-day attacks will help to reduce the complications and issues that are associated with new attacks.
The contributions of this work are threefold;
• Proposing and implementing an original and effective autoencoders model for zero-day
detection IDS.
• Building an outlier detection One-Class SVM model.
• Comparing the performance of the One-Class SVM model as a baseline outlier-based detector to
the proposed Autoencoder model.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; the background is presented in Section 2, Section 3
discusses the related work showing the results and approaches of recent IDS research. Section 4
describes the datasets that are used and how zero-day attacks are simulated. In Section 5, the proposed
models are explained. Section 6 presents the experimental results and findings. Finally, the paper is
concluded in Section 7.
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2. Background
In this section, the models utilised in this investigation are discussed. Section 2.1 describes the
deep-learning based autoencoder model and Section 2.2 describes an unsupervised variant of a support
vector machine model.
2.1. Autoencoders
The model that is proposed in this manuscript principally benefits from the autoencoder
characteristics and attributes. The objective is that the autoencoder acts as a light-weight outlier
detector, which could then be used for zero-day attacks detection, as further discussed in Section 5.2.
Rumelhart et al. [18] first introduced autoencoders in order to overcome the back propagation in
unsupervised context using the input as the target. Autoencoders are categorised as self-supervised,
since the input and the output are particularly the same [19]. As defined by Goodfellow et al. [20],
an Autoencoder is “a neural network that is trained to attempt to copy its input to its output” [20].
Figure 1 illustrates the basic architecture of an autoencoder. The architecture of an autoencoder and
the number of hidden layers differ based on the domain and the usage scenario.
Encode Decode
   ′
ℎ( )
Figure 1. Autoencoder Architecture.
Formally, given an input X , an autoencoder is trained in order to minimise the reconstruction
error, as demonstrated in Equation (1) [19].
φ : X → F
ψ : F → X
φ,ψ = argmin
φ,ψ
||X − (φ ◦ψ)X||2
(1)
such that φ and ψ represent the encoding and decoding functions, respectively.
Commonly, the reconstruction error of an input x is represented as the difference between x and
x′, such that:
x′ = g( f (x))
where f (x) is the encoding function, constructing the encoded vector of x; g(x) is the decoding
function, restoring x to its initial value
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The reconstruction error is defined by a function that represents the difference between the input x
and the reconstructed input x′. Mean square error and mean absolute error are common functions that
are used in order to calculate the reconstruction error, as shown in Equations (2) and (3), respectively.
MSE =
N
∑
i=1
(x′ − x)2 (2)
MAE =
N
∑
i=1
|x′ − x| (3)
Supposing that the encoding function f (x) is single layer network with a linear function,
the Autoencoder is viewed as equivalent to Principal Components Analysis (PCA) [21].
Autoencoders were originally used for dimensionality reduction and feature learning [22,23].
However, many other applications have been recently proposed. These applications include:
word semantics [24], image compression [25], image anomaly detection [26], denoising [27], and others.
2.2. One-Class SVM
The SVM is one of the most well-established supervised ML techniques. Given the training
samples, an SVM is trained to construct a hyperplane in a high-dimensional space that best separates
the classes [28]. This hyperplane is a line in two dimensions case, a plane in the case of three dimensions
(3D) or higher dimensions (n-dimensional). When data are not linearly separable, a kernel is used to
map the input features/data to a non-linear higher dimensional space, in which a hyperplane would
best separate the classes. The SVM kernels include; linear, polynomial, Gaussian, and Radial Basis
Function (RBF).
Formally, given two classes, the minimisation problem of SVM is represented, as shown in
Equation (4) [29].
min
w∈Rd
‖w‖2 + C
N
∑
i
max(0, 1− yi f (xi))
f (xi) = (wTxi + b)
(4)
where C is a regularisation parameter to represent the trade-off between ensuring that xi is on the
expected side of the plane and increasing the margin. Based on Equation (3), the data points fall in one
of three places based on yi f (xi). If yi f (xi) is greater than 1, then the point is outside the margin and it
does not contribute to the loss. If yi f (xi) equals 1, then the point is on the margin. Finally, if yi f (xi) is
less than 1, then the point contributes to the loss, as it is on the wrong side [30].
In contrast to its supervised counterpart, the One-Class SVM is an unsupervised variant. It is
defined as a model that is capable of detecting “Novelty” [31]. The goal of One-Class SVM is to fit a
hyperplane that acts as a boundary which best includes all the training data and excludes any other data
point. The result of training a One-Class SVM is seen as a spherically shaped boundary [32]. Because
One-Class SVM is considered to be one of the most established outlier-based ML techniques, it provides
an ideal comparison for assessing the performance of a deep neural network based autoencoder.
Formally, given a class with instances {x1, ..., xN}, and a mapping function ϕ() that maps the
features to a space H, the goal of One-Class SVM is to fit a hyperplane Π in H that has the largest
distance to the origin, and all ϕ(xi) lie at the opposite side of hyper-plane to the origin [33].
3. Related Work
IDS is defined as “a system or software that monitors a network or systems for malicious activity”.
Generally, IDSs can either be Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) or Host Intrusion Detection
System (HIDS). NIDS monitors the network and communication while HIDS monitors the internal
operation and log files [34]. Based on their detection techniques, IDSs are classified into Signature-based
IDS, which relies on known signatures of prior and known attacks, and Anomaly-based IDS,
Electronics 2020, 9, 1684 5 of 16
which relies on patterns [35]. When compared to signature-based IDS, anomaly-based IDS perform
better with complex attacks and unknown attacks.
In the past decade, researchers developed multiple techniques in order to enhance the robustness
of anomaly-based IDS. Subsequent to a long period of using statistical methods to detect cyber
anomalies and attacks, the need for ML emerged. Because of the sophistication of cyber-attacks,
statistical methods were rendered inadequate to handle their complexity. Therefore, with the
advancement of ML and DL in other domains (i.e., image and video processing, natural language
processing, etc.), the researchers adopted these techniques for cyber use. Nguyen and Reddi [7]
discuss the importance and benefit ML can provide to cybersecurity by granting a ‘robust resistance’
against attacks.
Based on the analysis of recent IDS research [36], ML has dominated the IDS research in the
past decade. The analysis shows that Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), SVM, and k-means are the
prevailing algorithms. Buczak and Guven [37] analyse the trends and complexity of different ML and
DL techniques used for IDS. Moreover, recent research is directed towards the use of DL to analyse
network traffic, due to the DL capabilities of handling complex patterns. Due to the complexity and
challenges that are associated with encrypted traffic, building robust and reliable DL-based IDSs is
crucial. Aceto et al. [38] describe this advancement in traffic encryption, as it ‘defeats traditional
techniques’ that relies on packet-based and port-based data. At the beginning of 2019, 87% of traffic
was encrypted [39], which emphasises on the growth and, thus the need for corresponding IDs.
Research has utilised flow-based features as the building block for training and analysing IDSs in order
to handle encrypted and non-encrypted traffic. The benefit of flow-based features, when compared to
packet-based ones, relies on the fact that they can be used with both encrypted and unencrypted traffic
and also they characterise high-level patterns of network communications. New DL approaches have
recently been used to build robust and reliable IDS. One of these techniques is autoencoders.
In the cyber security domain, autoencoders are used for feature engineering and learning.
Kunang et al. [40] used autoencoders for feature extraction, features are then passed into an SVM for
classification. KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets are both used for evaluation. The evaluation of
the model, using autoencoder for feature extraction and SVM for multi-class classification, has an
overall accuracy of 86.96% and precision of 88.65%. The different classes accuracies show a poor
performance, as follows: 97.91%, 88.07%, 12.78%, 8.12%, and 97.47% for DoS, probe, R2L, U2R,
and normal, respectively; a precision of 99.45%, 78.12%, 97.57%, 50%, and 81.59% for DoS, probe, R2L,
U2R, and normal, respectively.
Kherlenchimeg and Nakaya [41] use a sparse autoencoder to extract features. The latent
representation (the bottleneck layer of the autoencoder) is fed into a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN)
for classification. The accuracy of the IDS model while using the NSL-KDD dataset is 80%. Similarity,
Shaikh and Shashikala [42] focus on the detection of DoS attacks. They utilise a Stacked Autoencoder
with an LSTM network for the classification. Using the NSL-KDD dataset, the overall detection
accuracy is 94.3% and a false positive rate of 5.7%.
Abolhasanzadeh [43] used autoencoders for dimensionality reduction and the extraction of
bottleneck feature. The experiments were evaluated while using the NSL-KDD dataset. In a similar
fashion, Niyaz et al. [44] used autoencoders for unsupervised feature learning. They used the
NSL-KDD dataset. Additionally, AL-Hawawreh et al. [45] used deep autoencoders and trained
them on benign traffic in order to deduce the most important feature representation to be used in their
deep feed-forward ANN.
Shone et al. [46] use a Stacked Non-Symmetric Deep Autoencoder to refine and learn the complex
relationships between features that are then used in the classification using random forest technique.
The authors used both the KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets.
Farahnakian and Heikkonen [47] used a deep autoencoder to classify attacks. The deep autoencoder
is fed into a single supervised layer for classification. Using the KDD Cup’99 dataset, the highest
accuracies are 96.53% and 94.71% for binary and multi-class classification respectively.
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In agreement with our manuscript, Meidan et al. [48] utilised the encoding-decoding capabilities
of autoencoders to learn normal behaviour in IoT networks setup. Subsequently, IoT botnet and
malicious behaviour are detected when the autoencoder reconstruction fails. Bovenzi et al. [49]
emphasised the need for adaptive ML models to cope with the heterogeneity and unpredictability
of IoT networks. The authors propose a two-stage IDS model, where they leverage the autoencoder
capabilities in the first stage of their IDS.
4. Datasets
Two mainstream IDS datasets are chosen in order to evaluate the proposed models. The first is
the CICIDS2017 dataset [50], which was developed by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC).
The CICIDS2017 dataset covers a wide range of recent insider and outsider attacks. It comprises a
diverse coverage of protocols and attacks variations and, finally, it is provided in a raw format which
enables researchers the flexibility of processing the dataset. Therefore, the CICIDS2017 dataset is
well-suited for evaluating the proposed models.
The CICIDS2017 dataset is a recording of a five-day benign, insider and outsider attacks traffic.
The recorded PCAPs are made available. Table 1 summarises the traffic recorded per day. The raw
files of the CICIDS2017 dataset are pre-processed, as described in Section 5.1. The full CICIDS2017
description and analysis is available in [51,52].
Table 1. CICIDS2017 attacks.
Day Traffic
Monday Benign
Tuesday SSH & FTP Brute Force
Wednesday DoS/DDoS & Heartbleed
Thursday Web Attack (Brute Force, XSS, Sql Injection) & Infiltration
Friday Botnet, Portscan & DDoS
The second dataset is the NSL-KDD [53]. NSL-KDD was released by the CIC in order to overcome
the problems of the KDD Cup’99 dataset [54]. The KDD Cup’99 dataset was the dataset of choice for
evaluating more than 50% of the past decade IDS [36], followed by the NSL-KDD dataset, which was
used for evaluating over 17% of IDS. However, the KDD Cup’99 has multiple drawbacks, as discussed
thoroughly in [55]. These drawbacks include class imbalance and redundant records. Additionally,
Siddique et al. [56] discussed the warnings provided to the UCI lab advising not to use KDD Cup’99
dataset in further IDS research. Consequently, NSL-KDD fits for the evaluation purpose of this
manuscript, as well as the comparison with relevant research.
The NSL-KDD dataset covers normal/benign traffic and four cyber-attack classes, namely,
Denial of Service (DoS), probing, Remote to Local (R2L), and User to Root (U2R). The NSL-KDD
dataset is available in two files ‘KDDTrain+.csv’ and test file ‘KDDTest+.csv’. Similar to the KDD
Cup’99, the NSL-KDD dataset is provided in comma separated value (csv) feature files. Each instance
is represented with its feature values alongside the class label. The feature files undergo categorical
features encoding to be appropriate for ML usage. The KDD Cup’99 and NSL-KDD datasets are
analysed in [54]; furthermore, NSL-KDD is studied in [57].
5. Methodology, Approach and Proposed Models
In this section, the pre-processing of the datasets is discussed, followed by the explanation of the
proposed, showing both the training and evaluation processes. Subsequently, Section 6 details the
evaluation and results.
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5.1. CICIDS2017 Pre-Processing
The process that is involved in preparing the CICIDS2017 dataset for use is described as follows.
Firstly, ‘.pcap’ files of the CICIDS2017 dataset are split based on the attack type and the timestamps
provided by the dataset. This process results in a separate ‘.pcap’ file for each attack class. Secondly,
the ‘.pcap’ files are processed to generate bidirectional flows features. As highlighted by Rezaei and
Liu [58], with the advancement and complexity of networks and relying on encrypted traffic, features
need to be suitable for both encrypted and unencrypted traffic analysis. The authors also indicate
that flow-based features are better-suited for modern IDS development. Based on the analysis of
recent IDSs by Aceto et al. [38], flow and bidirectional flow features are the most commonly used.
Thirdly, features with high correlation are dropped in order to minimise model instability. Algorithm 1
describes the process of dropping highly correlated features. A threshold of ‘0.9’ is used. Features with
correlation less than the threshold are used for training. Finally, features are scaled using a Standard
Scalar. It is important to mention that only benign instances are used in selecting the features and
scaling in order to ensure zero influence of attack instances.
Algorithm 1 Drop correlated features
Input: Benign Data 2D Array, N, Correlation Threshold
Output: Benign Data 2D Array, Dropped Columns
1: correlation_matrix ← data.corr().abs()
2: upper_matrix ← correlation_matrix[i, j] {i, j ∈ N : i <= j}
3: dropped← i{i ∈ N : correlation_matrix[i,∗ ] > threshold}
4: data← data.drop_columns(dropped)
5: return data, dropped
As aforementioned, the goal is to train models using benign traffic and evaluate their performance
to detect attacks. Therefore, normal/benign traffic solely is used for training. The normal instances
are divided into 75% for training and 25% for testing/validation [59] by using sklearn train_test_split
function with the shuffling option set to True (https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/
sklearn.model_selection.train_test_split.html). Furthermore, each of the attack classes then mimics a
zero-day attack, thus assessing the ability of the model to detect its abnormality. Because the NSL-KDD
dataset is split into training and testing, attacks in both files are used for evaluation.
5.2. Autoencoder-Based Model
The building block for the proposed Autoencoder is an Artificial Neural Network (ANN).
For hyper-parameter optimisation, random search [60] is used in order to select the architecture
of the network, number of epochs, and learning rate. Random search is known to converge faster
than grid search to a semi-optimal set of parameters. It is also proved to be better than grid search
when a small number of parameters are needed [61]. Finally, it limits the possibility of obtaining
over-fitted parameters.
Once the hyper-parameters are investigated, the model is trained, as detailed in Algorithm 2.
First, the benign instances are split into 75%:25% for training and validation, respectively.
Subsequently, the model is initialised using the optimal ANN architecture (number of layers and
number of hidden neurons per layer). Finally, the model is trained for n number of epochs. The loss
and accuracy curves are observed in order to verify that the autoencoder convergence.
Once the model converges, as rendered in Figure 2, the model is evaluated using Algorithm 3.
An attack instance is flagged as a zero-day attack if the Mean Squared Error (MSE) (reconstruction
error) of the decoded (x′) and the original instance (x) is larger than a given threshold. For the purpose
of evaluation, multiple thresholds are assessed: 0.05, 0.1, 0.15. These thresholds are chosen based on
the value that is chosen by the random search hyper-parameter optimisation. The threshold plays an
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important role in deciding the value at which an instance is considered a zero-day attack, i.e., what MSE
between x′ and x is within the acceptable range.
Algorithm 2 Autoencoder Training
Input: benign_data, ANN_architecture, regularisation_value, num_epochs
Output: Trained Autoencoder
1: training = 75% i ∈ benign_data
2: testing = benign_data ∩ training
3: autoencoder ← build_autoencoder( ANN_Architecture, regularisation_value)
4: batch_size← 1024
5: autoencoder.train(batch_size, num_epochs, training, testing)
6: return autoencoder
Algorithm 3 Evaluation
Input: Trained Autoencoder, attack, thresholds
Output: Detection accuracies
1: detection_accuracies← {}
2: predictions← model.predict(attack)
3: for th ∈ thresholds do
4: accuracy← (mse(predictions, attack) > th)/len(attack)
5: detection_accuracies.add(threshold, accuracy)
6: end for
7: return detection_accuracies
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Validation Loss
Figure 2. Autoencoder Convergence Curves.
5.3. One-Class SVM Based Model
One-Class SVM is trained using the benign instances. In order to train the One-Class SVM, a ‘ν’
value was specified. As defined by Chen et al., “ν ∈ [0, 1], which is the lower and upper bound on
the number of examples that are support vectors and that lie on the wrong side of the hyperplane,
respectively.” [62]. The ν default value is 0.5, which includes 50% of the training sample in the
hyperplane. However, for the purpose of this experiment, multiple ν values were chosen (0.2, 0.15, 0.1).
These values were used in otder to evaluate and assess the autoencoder performance.
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Algorithm 4 shows the process of training the One-Class SVM mode. Similar to the model that
is discussed in Section 5.2, 75% of the benign samples are used to fit the One-Class SVM model.
Unlike the Autoencoder model, where the evaluation relies on a threshold, a One-Class SVM trained
model outputs a binary value {0,1}. The output represents whether an instance belongs to the class to
which the SVM is fit. Hence, each attack is evaluated based on how many instances are predicted with
a ‘0’ SVM output.
Algorithm 4 One-Class SVM Model
Input: benign_data, nu_value
Output: Trained SVM
1: training = 75% i ∈ benign_data
2: testing = benign_data ∩ training
3: oneclasssvm← OneClassSVM( nu_value, ‘rb f ′)
4: oneclasssvm. f it(training)
5: return oneclasssvm
6. Experimental Results
6.1. CICIDS2017 Autoencoder Results
As mentioned, 75% of the benign instances is used to train the Autoencoder. The autoencoder
optimised architecture for the CICIDS2017 dataset is comprised from an ANN network with 18 neurons
in both the input and the output layers and 3 hidden layers with 15, 9, 15 neurons respectively.
The optimal batch size is 1024. Other optimised parameters include mean square error loss,
L2 regularisation of 0.0001 and for 50 epochs.
Figure 3 summarises the autoencoder accuracy of all CICIDS2017 classes. It is crucial to note that
accuracy is defined differently for benign. Unlike attacks, for benign class, the accuracy represents the
rate of instances not classified as zero-day (i.e., benign) which reflects the specificity and for the attack
classes it represents the recall.
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Figure 3. CICIDS2017 Autoencoder Detection Results Summary Per Class.
By observing Figure 3, benign accuracy is 95.19%, 90.47% and 81.13% for a threshold of 0.15,
0.1 and 0.05 respectively. Moreover, for the different attack detection accuracy, it is observed that there
are three categories. Firstly, attacks that are very different from benign (for example, Hulk and DDoS),
the detection accuracy is high regardless the threshold [92–99%]. Secondly, classes that are slightly
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different from benign (for example, SSH Brute-force and Port scanning), an accuracy rise is observed
for lower thresholds. This emphasise the threshold’s role. Thirdly, classes that are not distinguishable
from benign traffic, they are detected but with a lower accuracy (for example, Botnet, SQL Injection
and DoS-SlowHTTPTest).
By observing Figure 3, different categories can be seen, (a) classes with a stable detection
accuracy (i.e., line), and (b) classes with a prompt rise in detection accuracy in the right-most
slice (0.05 threshold). Finally, the benign accuracy (top left) falls within an acceptable range with
different thresholds.
6.2. CICIDS2017 One-Class SVM Results
Table 2 summarises the One-Class SVM results. By observing the One-Class SVM results,
two assertions are identified, (a) the detection accuracy is not affected significantly by changing
ν value, and (b) the classes with high detection accuracy in the Autoencoder results (Figure 3 are also
detected by the One-Class SVM; however, the One-Class SVM fails to detect the two other categories
(rise in detection accuracy with small thresholds and low detection accuracy). This is due to the
limitations of the One-Class SVM algorithm which attempts to fit a spherical hyperplane to separate
benign class from other classes, however, classes that fall into this hyperplane will always be classified
as benign/normal.
This can further be visualised in Figure 4. One-Class SVM is well suited for flagging recognisable
zero-day attacks. However, autoencoders are better suited for complex zero-day attacks as the
performance rank is significantly higher. Furthermore, Figure 4 shows a class by class comparison of
the performance of autoencoder versus One-Class SVM. Figure 4a plots the results using One-Class
SVM ν = 0.2 and autoencoder threshold of 0.05, while Figure 4b plots the results using One-Class
SVM ν = 0.09 and autoencoder threshold of 0.1.
Table 2. CICIDS2017 One-Class Support Vector Machine (SVM) Results.
Class Accuracy
ν 0.2 0.15 0.1
Benign (Validation) 89.81% 84.84% 79.71%
FTP Bruteforce 10.19% 15.16% 20.29%
SSH Bruteforce 79.51% 80.26% 80.95%
DoS (Slowloris) 7.66% 8.38% 10.37%
DoS (GoldenEye) 71.87% 72.39% 72.85%
DoS (Hulk) 90.69% 91.35% 91.55%
DoS (Slowhttps) 98.59% 98.66% 98.71%
DDoS 39.35% 39.94% 40.96%
Heartbleed 99.49% 99.54% 99.58%
Web BF 21.1% 23.41% 35.84%
Web XSS 9.58% 9.76% 10.13%
Web SQL 5.77% 6.31% 6.85%
Infiltration - Dropbox 1 38.89% 38.89% 38.89%
Infiltration - Dropbox 2 29.41% 35.29% 35.29%
Infiltration - Dropbox 3 57.14% 57.14% 57.14%
Infiltration - Cooldisk 92.15% 93.8% 94.91%
Botnet 44.23% 46.15% 50%
PortScan 59.27% 60.04% 63.43%
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Figure 4. CICIDS2017 Autoencoder, One-Class SVM Comparison.
6.3. NSL-KDD Results
The autoencoder optimised architecture for the NSL-KDD dataset is comprised from an ANN
network with 122 neurons in both the input and output layers and three hidden layers with 100, 60,
100 neurons, respectively. The optimal batch size is 1024. Other optimised parameters include mean
absolute error loss, L2 regularisation of 0.001, and for 50 epochs.
Table 3 shows the autoencoder results for the NSL-KDD dataset. As aforementioned, attacks in
both the KDDTrain+ and KDDTest+ files are used in order to evaluate the model. Similar to the results
that are discussed in Section 6.1, the trade-off between the threshold choice and the true negative rate
is observed.
Furthermore, when compared to the most recent available autoencoder implementation for
detecting zero-day attacks in the literature [63], the autoencoder that is proposed in this manuscript
largely outperforms the performances of [63]. The work proposed by Gharib et al. [63] used a hybrid
two stage autoencoder to detect normal and abnormal traffic. Training on KDDTrain+ file and testing on
KDDTest+, the overall accuracy of their proposed model is 90.17%, whereas the proposed autoencoder
in this manuscript the overall accuracy is 91.84%, 92.96%, and 91.84% using a threshold of 0.3, 0.25,
and 0.2, respectively. It is important to highlight that Gharib et al. [63] do not mention details regarding
how they define anomalies or zero-day attacks or the classes they use in the testing process. Moreover,
as summarised in Table 4, it is shown that the proposed approach in this manuscript outperforms the
Denoising Autoencoder that is proposed in [64], specifically with the KDDTest+ instances with the
authors accuracy is capped by 88%, while this manuscript reaches 93%.
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Table 3. NSL-KDD Autoencoder Results.
Class Accuracy
Threshold 0.3 0.25 0.2
KDDTrain+.csv
Normal (Validation) 78.81% 77.63% 78.81%
DoS 98.15% 98.16% 98.15%
Probe 99.89% 99.94% 99.89%
R2L 83.12% 96.48% 83.12%
U2R 84.62% 100% 84.62%
KDDTest+.csv
Normal 84.82% 84.42% 84.82%
DoS 94.67% 94.67% 94.67%
Probe 100% 100% 100%
R2L 95.95% 96.5% 95.95%
U2R 83.78% 89.19% 83.78%
Table 4. NSL-KDD Performance Comparison with Recent Literature. (Highest accuracy in Bold).
Year Reference Approach Train:Test % ofKDDTrain+
KDDTrain+
Accuracy
KDDTest+
Accuracy
This paper
AE th = 0.3
AE th = 0.25
AE th = 0.2
75 : 25
88.92%
94.44%
88.92%
91.84%
92.96%
91.84%
2019 [63] 2 AEs - - 90.17%
2017 [64] AEDenoising AE 80 : 20
93.62%
94.35%
88.28%
88.65%
Table 5 summarises the NSL-KDD One-Class SVM results. The results show a similar detection trend.
This is due to the limited number and variance of attacks that are covered by the NSL-KDD dataset.
Table 5. NSL-KDD One-Class SVM Results.
Class Accuracy
ν 0.2 0.15 0.1
KDDTrain+.csv
Normal (Validation) 89.9% 85.14% 80.54%
DoS 98.13% 98.14% 98.14%
Probe 97.74% 98.77% 99.52%
R2L 49.35% 52.26% 81.71%
U2R 78.85% 80.77% 82.69%
KDDTest+.csv
Normal 88.12% 86.02% 84.72%
DoS 94.67% 94.67% 94.69%
Probe 99.55% 99.91% 100%
R2L 80.17% 82.22% 90.31%
U2R 78.38% 78.38% 83.78%
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7. Conclusions and Future Work
The work that is presented in this manuscript proposes a new outlier-based zero-day cyber-attacks
detection. The main goal was to develop an intelligent IDS model that is capable of detecting zero-day
cyber-attacks with a high detection accuracy while overcoming the limitations of currently available
IDS. This manuscript purposes and evaluates an autoencoder model to detect zero-day attacks.
The idea is inspired by the encoding-decoding capability of autoencoders.
The results show high detection accuracy for the autoencoder model for both the CICIDS2017
and the NSL-KDD. The CICIDS2017 zero-day detection accuracy reaches 90.01%, 98.43%, 98.47%,
and 99.67% for DoS (GoldenEye), DoS (Hulk), Port scanning, and DDoS attacks. Moreover,
the NSL-KDD detection accuracy reached 92.96%, which outperforms the only available zero-day
autoencoder-based detection manuscript [63].
Furthermore, the autoencoder model is compared to an unsupervised outlier-based ML technique;
One-Class SVM. One-Class SVM is a prominent unsupervised ML technique that detects outliers.
The one-class SVM mode presents its effectiveness in detecting zero-day attacks for NSL-KDD datasets
and the distinctive ones from the CICIDS2017 dataset. When compared to One-Class SVM, autoencoder
demonstrates its surpassing detection accuracy. Furthermore, both of the models demonstrate low
miss rate (false-positives). Future work involves evaluating the proposed models with datasets that
cover special purpose network IDS (e.g., IoT and Critical Infrastructure networks), which will comprise
insights into adapting the proposed models, as well as proposing and adapting other ML techniques
to use for zero-day attack detection. The source code for building and evaluating the proposed models
will be made available through an open-source GitHub repository.
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